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F9LKVIDM 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 3 VIDIVIXI, LLC, Plaintiff, 4 5 15 CV 7364 (JGK) v. 6 FRANCIS T. BRADLEY, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 New York, N.Y. 9 September 21, 2015 3:00 p.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. JOHN G. KOELTL, 12 District Judge 13 APPEARANCES 14 MATTHEW ADAM PEK 15 Attorney for Plaintiffs 16 RAO LAW GROUP Attorney for Grattan Defendants 17 BY: SIDDARTHA RAO 18 JEAN LIN, Pro Se Defendant 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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THE DEPUTY CLERK: Vidivixi versus Grattan.

All parties, please state who they are, for the record.

MR. PEK: Good afternoon, your Honor. Matthew A. Pek, Esq., The Peksquire Group, 387 Grand Street, Suite K203, New York, New York 10002, counsel for plaintiff. Good afternoon, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. RAO: Thank you, your Honor. Siddartha Rao, Rao Law Group. I'm representing Mark Grattan, who's also here today in court, and the Mark Grattan building and design defendant.

MS. LIN: My name is Jean Lin. I'm representing I'm also the sole owner and operator of Jean Lin LLC. myself. THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon, all.

This is a order to show cause. It seeks to bring on a preliminary injunction and it also includes a temporary restraining order. So I'll listen to the parties.

An observation: I don't have any papers in opposition to the order to show cause for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. It's plain that I will set a schedule for the response to the motion papers for a preliminary injunction, a response, a reply, and then set it down for a hearing.

So the real issue is the temporary restraining order.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant is using the trademark name Vidivixi and that the defendant has also been effectively siphoning proceeds that should go to Vidivixi, to himself. And there is an issue with respect to certain specific pieces of furniture which I believe Ms. Lin has and which the plaintiff says belongs to the plaintiff and not the defendant. So there is an issue about what happens to that furniture while the preliminary injunction is decided.

So the question is: Should there be a temporary restraining order before the preliminary injunction can be decided, and what the extent, if any, of that temporary restraining order should be.

Okay, Mr. Pek.

MR. PEK: Thank you, your Honor.

Actually, I should first note for the record, about an hour ago, maybe two hours ago, I received a phone call from Ms. Lin's corporate counsel, who has advised her in the past on nonlitigation related matters, including the incorporation of her LLC, which was also a defendant here. He has, Aaron Goldberg of Holland & Knight has, given me all assurances, as has Ms. Lin -- from the very first response I received from her after writing my first letter on behalf of my client, effectively terminating the lease and consignment agreement whereby my client was permitted to showcase these five pieces of furniture in Ms. Lin's showroom referred to as Colony -- we

have received all assurances that the status quo has been preserved. And Ms. Lin astutely responded to me at the outset that it was her understanding that Vidivixi was a partnership between effectively Francis T. Bradley, one of the plaintiffs, and Mark A. Grattan, one of the defendants, and not solely owned by my client; therefore, pending a court order or mutual resolution between the parties, she would effectively be taking a hands-off position, which is exactly effectively what we would have hoped for.

Having said that, and having shared a conversation with Mr. Goldberg, who has advised Ms. Lin in connection with this matter, likely -- and I should just note he is a corporate attorney and I do want to just disclaim that -- that I am confident that, following the procedural history, if you will, that I have just recounted for your Honor, along with my phone call with Ms. Lin's counsel, I do not think a temporary restraining order with respect to those five pieces is necessary pending a hearing on the preliminary injunction.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

Is there any dispute with respect to entering a temporary restraining order that doesn't affect the five pieces, that essentially says that the defendants can't use the name Vidivixi until the preliminary injunction is decided?

MR. PEK: Your Honor, that is a separate issue that we in fact do continue today and, as set forth in our papers,

believe is necessary, based on quite simply email correspondence and invoices that were discovered by my client not long ago indicating — now, we don't know whether any transactions have in fact taken place but the mere fact that these invoices bearing the Vidivixi mark, which my client is the sole owner of, and I believe we have included the United States Patent and Trademark Office serial number registration to that effect, that irreparable harm has been suffered and will continue to be suffered so long as any business is done under the name Vidivixi, including, I should mention, the website itself, which was recently reactivated but is beyond my client's control. It's a dicey matter because, to be perfectly frank, Mr. Grattan, as I understand it, by my client, Mr. Bradley, was authorized to register the domain name as the registrant for Vidivixi.com.

However, my client has, as with all other things in this business -- and I don't think that there will be a dispute as to opposition to this effect -- financed every nickel and penny of the operation. Nonetheless, my client has no means of access to the domain name itself; it was recently reactivated.

But another concern is that there is a click-through mechanism whereby the defendant has a website of his own -- I believe it's Mark Grattan, just his name, eliminating the middle initial or middle name, dot-com, that if you visit it, it's an automatic click-through to Vidivixi.com. That, coupled

with the invoice we have discovered and the sales and effectively what we aim to achieve with respect to those invoices at a hearing to be set by your Honor, at your Honor's discretion, is an accounting and, if necessary, a creation of constructive trust or a position of constructive trust for any proceeds that, in our position, we believe would be ill-gotten and should be allocated in accordance with Vidivixi's ownership structure and reflective of the true individuals that do own, or individual I should say, the LLC and the Vidivixi enterprise before it was incorporated.

THE COURT: Okay.

Let me listen to the defendant.

MR. RAO: Yes, your Honor. First, I just want to point out one procedural matter. Plaintiffs' counsel did not serve papers until Saturday, after midnight. He subsequently served exhibits on Sunday. Many of the papers appear to be unsigned, I believe they are missing papers, and I don't even know if I have full notice of what it is that plaintiff has filed because this case was not --

THE COURT: Just keep your voice up, please.

MR. RAO: Yes, your Honor. I just want to correct a few misstatements.

First, there's no trademark for Vidivixi. There is actually no registered mark. Mark Grattan --

THE COURT: Maybe you want to go to the podium? It

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might be easier than bending over.

MR. RAO: Sure.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. RAO: Yes, your Honor.

We're dealing with a fairly extraordinary fact pattern, where Francis Bradley, the petitioner, and Mark Grattan were partners in a partnership for over a year, held themselves out as partners, signed contracts as partners, sent emails as partners; in fact, the papers were served on Mark at his address at Vidivixi.com. Respondent has always had control over the domain. In fact, the website was originally set up as a mirror to MarkGrattan.com. Respondent designed the logo and all the furniture which is the subject of this TRO. These are facts that are based on documents that I have reviewed, business records of Vidivixi. It's advertised on the website as a partnership and, as I said before, there's no actual trademark.

What has happened here is that petitioner, without telling respondent, both filed for a trademark and incorporated an LLC on August 26th, a mere day after Mr. Grattan sent a partnership proposal to Mr. Bradley to try to document the partnership which had existed for year. If I understand petitioner's argument correctly, he is trying to say that the mere filing of an LLC creates an ownership in a mark Vidivixi, that LLC, as I said before, was neither disclosed to Mark

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Grattan nor is there any basis to assume that it owns the mark Vidivixi.

This would be like me filing an LLC application for McDonalds LLC and then serving demand upon McDonalds for their brand, goodwill and profits, and there is no legal basis for that.

As far as the preliminary injunction and TRO --THE COURT: I'm sorry, in the papers that the plaintiff submitted, there is an application that was filed for Vidivixi in March of 2015.

MR. RAO: Your Honor, that application is still There's been not only no registration but it hasn't even published for opposition. In fact, I have very strong legal grounds to believe it's void, it is an intent-to-use application and was filed on behalf of the wrong party. With intent-to-use applications, they have to be filed on the party actually using the application.

Here, the application was filed by Francis T. Bradley LLC, which is claimed as a New York LLC; there is no actual record of Francis T. Bradley LLC on the New York Department of State website. I did a business search and couldn't find any record of it. In any case, it's alleged as a mark of Vidivixi LLC, the application is void ab initio, it hasn't registered, and it hasn't published, it doesn't create any rights.

We have an issue here, your Honor, with petitioner's

counsel having sent numerous letters threatening legal action if furniture is not returned to him, on the basis of an LLC filing well after the fact and long after both Mark Grattan and Francis Bradley had been in a partnership. That partnership is based on, unfortunately, not an incorporation of a partnership document but several emails and, as I said, the domain Mark@Vidivix.com, with which petitioner corresponded with Mark Grattan on numerous occasions.

They employed outside people, as a partnership; as I said, they signed contracts as partners; frequently

Mr. Bradley, Mr. Pek's client, was copied on emails where Mark

Grattan called himself a cofounder. He at no point objected.

This went on for over a year.

So, it's fairly extraordinary that Mr. Pek would come into court today on the basis of an LLC filing and attempt to not preserve the status quo but actually upset the status quo and prevent my client from doing what he's been doing for over a year.

THE COURT: The plaintiff says that your client established a click-through website so that if there were people who were trying to buy goods from Vidivixi, they were routed to your client.

MR. RAO: It's actually the opposite, your Honor.

But, first, I want to correct one other statement, which is that there have actually been no sales and no

proceeds. Largely, this is because within the designer community there's now confusion due to Mr. Bradley's new assertion that there is no partnership. Nobody knows who to write checks to, nobody knows really what the partnership is anymore. So they haven't been able to sell any furniture. Regardless of whatever happens today, there won't be any sale of furniture until this business dispute is sorted out.

As to your question, when the website was originally set up, my client, Mark Grattan, took the lead in developing the site, designed the logo. At the time, there was no content, so he mirrored Vidivixi with his site so they could have a presence.

Today, it's not that Vidivixi points to him but his site points to them because he is the face of Vidivixi, he is the person who has attended every meeting --

THE COURT: "He," Mark Grattan?

MR. RAO: Yes. He has created the contacts, the network, and he has designed all the furniture. It is true that Mr. Bradley has financed a good portion of that but he's done so as a silent partner, both in the legal sense and in literally not responding to emails and being silent. He has simply not put in the work and the effort and the sweat that my client has. It's a very typical arrangement, that one partner provides financing and another partner provides sweat equity.

I would also add that I have looked at documents

definitely showing that at the inception of this partnership Mark Grattan donated two of his designs to the partnership in lieu of a cash donation. So there was a sweat-effort/intellectual property, I would say, donation to the partnership. It's very clear they were partners, from their own statements to third parties.

THE COURT: The plaintiff says that there were these invoices which they have attached which were payable to Vidivixi and, so far as the plaintiff knows, those invoices were then paid to Mark Grattan.

MR. RAO: Yes, your Honor. As I understand it, the plaintiff took a hard drive out of Mark Grattan's workshop, accessed many of his personal files without his permission, and did find invoicing with the logo Vidivixi. Mark Grattan, of course, has an independent design practice. He has become so identified with Vidivixi that he has often identified himself as Mark Grattan of the Vidivixi partnership, much as a musician when they play with a different band might identify themselves by their stage name. I don't think it was any more or less than that.

I wish that Mr. Bradley had simply attempted to negotiate with Mark. What in fact happened was, as soon as Mark sent a proposal to Mr. Bradley, the next day he began sending legal demand letters and would not negotiate at all.

THE COURT: You say that until this case is decided,

there will be no sales. What does that mean? No sales of what?

MR. RAO: Well, there's currently furniture being held in the showroom known as the Colony. That furniture has not been sold. I believe what triggered this entire dispute were sales inquiries that came in. This necessitated some formal partnership agreement. Rather than negotiate that agreement, petitioner has filed for a TRO. When I say there will be no sales, obviously I received papers Saturday at midnight and Sunday at 5:00 p.m., so I have done what inquiry I can, but based on my inquiry within the marketplace for high-end furniture, design people are not willing to execute on sales orders until they know who they should be paying.

THE COURT: So does that mean that you agree that there will be no sales under the Vidivixi mark until the preliminary injunction is decided?

MR. RAO: That's my understanding, your Honor. As a practical matter, there can't be and my client is happy to abide by a no-sale until preliminary injunction is decided.

THE COURT: Okay.

You've seen the order to show cause for preliminary injunction --

MR. RAO: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- with the temporary restraining order?

25 Have you gone through the individual paragraphs?

1 MR. RAO: I have, your Honor. THE COURT: So, which paragraphs do you object to? 2 3 MR. RAO: If the Court will permit, I actually left my 4 copy on the bench. 5 THE COURT: Sure. 6 MR. RAO: I'll get it. Thank you. 7 THE COURT: Thank you. MR. RAO: Your Honor, at a higher level, I think what 8 9 I am trying to say is that the request for relief is based on several serious misstatements of fact. But to address your 10 11 specific question: 12 I believe petitioner wants to enjoin my client from 13 any use of the Vidivixi mark. Currently, he has the domain 14 Mark@Vidivixi.com, which petitioner has not only served papers 15 to him and has corresponded with him at, he corresponds with others as Mark@Vidivixi.com. It's effectively shutting down 16 17 his ability as a partner in this business to pursue any business if he cannot use the email Mark@Vidivixi.com. 18 THE COURT: So --19 20 MR. RAO: So that would be 3(a). That would also be 21 3(b)? 22 THE COURT: Yes, but the temporary restraining order 23 really is on page 4, ordered that --24 MR. RAO: So -- sorry, your Honor. Paragraph (a) and

paragraph (b), with the understanding that that furniture has

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not been sold and is not going to be sold. 1 2 THE COURT: So you object to paragraph (a)? 3 MR. RAO: Yes, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Okay. And (b) is moot? 5 MR. RAO: Yes, your Honor. 6 I think one of the issues with (c) is, I'm not 7 entirely clear what it is that petitioner is talking about. At least from my reading of their papers, there's no factual basis 8 9 for the assertion that my client would destroy the mark. Since 10 he is currently in a partnership with Mr. Bradley, it would 11 actually be irrational for him to cause harm to the Vidivixi 12 mark. It's as much his identity and also petitioner's. 13 So I believe my objection to (c) is, it's too vaque 14 for me to understand what conduct they're referring to. 15 MR. PEK: Your Honor, I'm willing to waive (c) and strike that if it will facilitate a more expeditious, narrower 16 17 resolution of the issues that are actually at bar, many of 18 which my adversary has just noted upon. 19 THE COURT: Okay. So the parties agree to strike (c), 20 the parties agree to strike (b) as moot. 21 Okay, (d)? 22 MR. RAO: With respect to (d), I don't think anyone 23 has a problem with the status quo. Mark Grattan has always 24 been the administrator of the domain. Again, I really don't

understand (d), I can't agree to that, I have to object to

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that.

THE COURT: Okay. We will take that up.

All right.

MR. RAO: Paragraph (e), your Honor, is a somewhat of a mirror of paragraph 3(b), that I pointed out earlier. As I said, Mr. Grattan is a partner of Vidivixi, he interacts with the entire design community as a partner of Vidivixi, and paragraph (e) would effectively stop him from doing what he does as a design professional.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RAO: And as I said before, paragraph (f) prevents him from using a business email, which petitioner has consented to for a very long time. In fact, they set up those emails together and, as I said, they have corresponded back and forth on those emails.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RAO: With respect to paragraph (g), I'm not entirely sure what the petitioner is getting at. It's actually petitioner who has attempted to register Vidivixi as a word mark. My understanding of trademark law may be incomplete but I believe that would prevent a third party from registering the domain as a mark.

As I've said, I believe that registration is a void application in any event, but with respect to paragraph (g), I can represent that my client has no desire at this point to

register a mark until this dispute has been resolved. To the extent that that's what (g) is getting at, the trademark registration, we can agree to that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RAO: And then with respect to paragraph (h), again, in light of the fact that this is a partnership, it's unclear what unfair competition is referring to. I actually don't know how to respond to that except to say that if there were any sort of proceed or sale from Vidivixi — and there has been none to date — I have to believe my client would agree to inform petitioner. And this is separate from the five pieces of furniture which we have agreed are not going to be sold until this is resolved, but if the issue is some suspicion that he has somehow sold under the name, we can clear that up by saying that any sales have to be agreed to, until this is resolved.

Paragraph (i), again, is not a preservation of status quo; it's actually an extraordinary request to undo the status quo, namely, the partnership. And I am going to object to that as well.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PEK: Your Honor, if I may respond to a few assertions that my adversary has put on the record?

THE COURT: Yes, yes.

MR. PEK: First of all, it is well settled trademark

law that you need not be registered in order to obtain protection as a trademark.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, could you speak into the microphone.

MR. PEK: Forgive me, your Honor.

Vidivixi --

THE COURT: You can sit down.

MR. PEK: Thank you, your Honor.

It is well settled that a trademark need not be registered or filed or applied for registration on the principal or supplemental register with a USPTO in order to enjoy the benefits provided by the policy, the unfair competition upon which the Lanham Act is based. There are countless trademark infringement litigation between unregistered marks. A trademark is a source identifier.

My client, prior to ever joining up in whatever capacity it was -- and I respectfully and firmly submit that there is absolutely no writing or indication or agreement confirming or indicating that these individuals are partners, and that in the absence of such a writing the partnership law dictates that profits follow losses and that losses are to be shared 50/50.

So before we talk about any sales, which I will take at face value, the representation of my adversary that there were none, then in order to ascertain the profit, of course,

you need to first understand the expense, which has been entirely from my client's out-of-pocket investment, capital contribution, expense, however you'd like to cast it.

To suggest that the registration or the application and filing of an ITU application by my client, who has plainly indicated on the registrar that Francis T. Bradley is the owner, I do see that the legal entity was indicated a limited liability company, but there's no name given. That was, in my understanding, an error on the part of my client, but it does not remove Vidivixi from appropriate trademark protection.

But for my client bumping into, as I understand it,
Mr. Grattan -- who was a former colleague, friend and peer at
the Pratt Institute -- at a wood shop in Sunset Park,
Mr. Grattan never knew what Vidivixi was, and yet it was an
enterprise, a vision and a business in the making prior to
Mr. Grattan's involvement. I will not deny, and neither will
my client, that Mr. Grattan absolutely did participate in a lot
of what Vidivixi did, and a lot of what they have achieved in
the way of critical acclaim and awards; for instance, the
Architectural Digest expo this past March. That does not
entitle him to make sales under the Vidivixi name without
apprising my client.

And no matter what you want to call this relationship, whether it's a freelance independent contractor or partnership, if it is a partnership, then clearly that highest punctilio of

loyalty and honor, as Judge Cardozo, in the case of Meinhard v. Salmon, first articulated has been breached with no remorse and in the most brazen and strident manner.

I also have to accept, looking at -- well, first, looking at any of the invoices which bear the mark Vidivixi at the top as a letterhead, if you will, all payments are to be made directed specifically and unequivocally to Mark Grattan. That simply doesn't comport with any characterization of the relationship, as my adversary would have the Court believe.

More to the point, I look to an email which is taken from my client's server, and but for it being sent to Mark@Vidivixi.com, we would not have access to that server, which, it's been known all along, both Francis and Mark, in addition to Francis' cousin, Kyle Bradley, who helped set up the domain name, of course, had access to, and confirming that Mark had received payment for at least one piece of furniture, for some four-figure amount.

I did not Bates stamp, I did not have time, but the -THE COURT: What exhibit?

MR. PEK: It's Exhibit 8. Page 15, page 15, subject regarding invoice attached. And it's from Mark Grattan to a gentleman by the name of Hymie Brunette. I have redacted all sensitive information, routing numbers and such, as the two exchanged emails —

MR. RAO: I don't see any redactions.

THE COURT: I don't see a page 15.

MR. PEK: It's the 15th page of Exhibit 8.

THE COURT: I have Exhibit 8. It only has five pages.

MR. PEK: Well, your Honor, I will take fault for that, but I'm positively certain that all of the highlighted emails that were red-flagged for me and my client, and therefore we were going to bring to the Court's attention, have been highlighted and hand-selected.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Pause)

THE COURT: This is Exhibit 7.

MR. PEK: Forgive me, your Honor. As I explained to Mr. Fletcher, when contacted following my submission of the order to show cause papers to your Honor's law clerk -- I believe his name is Matthew Ferrara, I don't want to get the last name wrong -- I had to confess to Mr. Fletcher that I had submitted to the Court my only copies of the order-to-show-cause papers. In my limited experience of submitting similar papers requesting similar relief from the Southern District, it's been my experience that I would receive a phone call or often wait in the corridor while the judge would sign and conform an order to show cause, instructing us whether bond needed to be posted, granting certain relief, denying certain relief and the method and manner of service, by which date. Instead, I got a contacted by Mr. Fletcher, so I

explained to him that I am going to have to put these 12 exhibits back together by memory.

That will explain any discrepancies as between the page numbers, but I give you all assurances, under penalties of perjury, that to the T, to the page, they have been exactly reproduced.

THE COURT: Okay. So I have two copies before me, I have the original and I have the courtesy copy.

By the way, the general practice, my understanding, for judges in the court, and my practice invariably, is if you give me an order to show cause, particularly one which contains a temporary restraining order, I don't sign an order to show cause with a temporary restraining order without notice to the other side. So you have to provide notice to the other side, you give a copy of the papers to the other side, and then you come in, so you have -- my understanding is that the general practice of judges in the court is, we don't sign TROs without notice to the other side. So you give the papers to the other side and then you come in when the judge says I'll hear you on the order to show cause with the temporary restraining order, we'll set up the date for the preliminary injunction, and you can explain why pending a decision on the preliminary injunction you should take a temporary restraining order.

It would be the exception rather than the rule that the judges of the court sign TROs without notice to the other

side.

MR. PEK: Understood, your Honor. However, I can — well, I don't want to undermine your Honor's rules, by which I assure you plaintiff and counsel will abide. However, it's my personal understanding, having spoken with the clerks in room 200 and having done this before, that so long as you provide the other side with one hour's notice, which I did, of your intention to appear at this courtroom at this time, to present for the Court an order to show cause seeking X, Y and Z relief, that that is sufficient.

I understand completely your Honor's position, and it is not discordant with my experience; it is something of form over substance. For instance, Judge Swain, the late Judge Sprizzo and Judge Rakoff, from memory, I can recall, denied most of our relief, set a hearing —

THE COURT: Fine. If that's what you want me to do, having come in, that's not a problem; I will strike all of the requests for temporary relief and set a prompt hearing on the preliminary injunction. The reason for calling you in is to give both sides the opportunity to talk about the temporary restraining order. But if you prefer the other practice, that's not a problem.

MR. PEK: Understood, your Honor. Respectfully, I do not prefer the other practice and I seem to have been mistaken, so I apologize for that.

THE COURT: So, we were really at, you wanted to show me Exhibit 7, I think. And the email that you were referring to is: "Hi, Lailani. Awesome meeting. Thanks for giving me the time. Attached is the product info for the pieces you were most interested in"? Is that it?

MR. PEK: It's the one immediately preceding that email, which I think, on balance, also tends to suggest a sale has been completed. But it is dated Wednesday, September 2nd, from Mark Grattan, Info@MarkGrattan.com, to

HymieBrunette@gmail.com. "Yes!" in response to the immediately preceding email from Mr. Brunette: "Hey, just wanted to make sure you got payment. Hit me back when you can."

THE COURT: Okay. What do you do with Mark Grattan's argument that you all actually had a partnership?

MR. PEK: In the event that this Court does find the partnership in fact or implied in fact was the relationship between the parties, I find categorically that Mr. Grattan has breached every fiduciary duty that comes attendant to that.

And I don't mean to be academic about this, but I will cite Meinhard v. Salmon, where Judge Cardozo did first note that, if we are to be partners in this country, then we owe each other that highest of fiduciary duties.

And to not advise your partner of any of these queries? My client has not recognized a single cent in sales at all. And I would share Mr. Rao's expectation that if they

were partners, that Mr. Grattan would of course inform his partner of a potential sale. But that was not the case.

I do also want to note in the way of irreparable harm -- and this is the trademark aside and the partnership aside -- that in the Second Circuit, injuries to one's commercial reputation has been held to be sufficient as evidence of irreparable harm. Upon information and belief, although I cannot produce the email itself, my client has been led to believe by other sources that the defendant has sent out inflammatory and defamatory statements, emails, to others indicating that he is on a quote-unquote rampage, that he has stolen things --

THE COURT: But that's not a claim in the current complaint.

MR. PEK: No, it is not. However, we of course reserve the right to amend the complaint --

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. PEK: -- but, most importantly, we are looking forward to a hearing on the preliminary injunction, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. The defendant says no sales are going to be made on the Vidivixi site because the industry knows that there is a dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant. Do you agree with that?

MR. PEK: I'm sorry, your Honor, could you repeat that one more time?

THE COURT: The defendant says, the industry knows that there is a dispute over the name Vidivixi and there are no sales that are going to be made with respect to that site until this is decided. My question was: Do you agree with that?

MR. PEK: I disagree with that, based on inter alia the week-old, ten days old emails indicating there were such sales.

THE COURT: No, no, no, but for the period of time -MR. PEK: Right now?

THE COURT: -- right now from now until the time that the preliminary injunction is decided.

MR. PEK: Yes, I will accept that representation from the defendant, although I am not in a position, nor do I think is the defendant, to say as to what the community is that has the perception of Vidivixi or whether there is a dispute beyond Ms. Lin, who houses the five pieces at issue.

Your Honor, if I may address one final point relevant to the order to show cause?

THE COURT: Yes, sure.

MR. PEK: As your Honor is aware, in addition to likelihood of success on the merits and demonstration of irreparable harm, the Federal Rules and case law and the Lanham Act and progeny have made plain that, when relevant, a balance of the hardships or balance of the equities is to be considered for purposes of (a) in the first instance, granting the

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requested TRO or, in other instances, in setting the amount of a bond. The final exhibit to my client's affidavit, which was also culled from our or my client's email server, from the Vidivixi server, tend to indicate that in fact Mr. Grattan does intend to move on and has engaged other — or has been engaged, rather, as a consultant working for other third parties interested in Mr. Grattan alone.

I would respectfully submit that in addition to further supplement, my response to your question before as to defendants' representation as of now about Vidivixi sales being made, Exhibit 12 gives me further confidence in my expectation that they will not be, but, more to the point, that no undue harm or no -- the balance of the hardships in this case -forgive me; I'll put it differently. In the event that this Court does decide that a temporary restraining order to any effect concerning Mr. Grattan is warranted, we respectfully submit that due to the new business ventures, among other things, such as my client's venture capital investment but mostly, to what we know, has been a new business opportunity, a new job, a new gig, if you will, with an entity by the name of Friends and Family, with whom, upon information and belief, Defendant Mark Grattan has entered into a consulting agreement, that under the circumstances no bond is warranted, in part because he will suffer no harm from this relief being issued, as he has other going concerns presumably or ostensibly, based

upon our review of our own records.

THE COURT: In the request for the temporary restraining order, the first request, to relinquish the rights to the five pieces, that's moot, is it not, because those are the five pieces that Ms. Lin has? Right?

MR. PEK: Those are the five pieces that Ms. Lin has. And I think it will have to be an issue either for the parties to settle an order, if they can come to an agreement, so as not to split the baby, for lack of a better word, of those five beautiful pieces, those show pieces, but it will be an issue of fact for the Court to determine who and in what proportion the parties or which of the parties own each of those five pieces.

MR. RAO: Your Honor, can I clarify a few things?
THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

MR. RAO: First, I believe that petitioner is kind of trying to have it both ways here. Mark Grattan is an independent designer who did enter into a partnership with Francis Bradley. The complaint seems to allege that he is an independent contractor, in which case, he would own everything he designed, including the logo and the furniture which he designed, absent any work-for-hire agreement. They seem to want him to be an independent contractor when it suits them and want him to not be when it suits them.

The facts are very clear because Mr. Bradley signed contracts stating both of them are cofounders. The facts are

also very clear that Mr. Bradley never paid my client a salary, never signed a noncompete or enforced a noncompete, and there is no understanding that Mr. Grattan is not allowed to sell furniture as himself. This is a partnership under the brand name Vidivixi, it's a project between the two of them.

Mr. Bradley presumably has other going concerns and Mr. Grattan presumably has other going concerns, and I don't, frankly, see the relevance of that.

As to the trademark, which seems to be coming up a lot, I just want to very simply state that when Mr. Bradley filed for a trademark there was no such thing as Vidivixi LLC. Vidivixi LLC was a creation of less than a month ago. It appears to have been a creation simply used as a tool to threaten Jean Lin and my client to give up property and intellectual property that, as I've already stated, Mr. Grattan created. There simply was no LLC a month ago.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll have a hearing on the preliminary injunction on October 5, 2015, at 9:00 o'clock in the forenoon. I don't see any provision in the proposed order to show cause for responsive papers, but responsive papers are due September 28, 2015; reply papers are due September 30, 2015.

The parties are welcome, if they want, between now and October 5, to take any depositions that they wish. I'll have a final conference with you on October 2 at 4:30 p.m., in

preparation for the preliminary injunction. I'm prepared to put aside whatever time is necessary on October 5 and October 6 for the preliminary injunction hearing, if you want an evidentiary hearing. If you do, I'll give you time limits, so that two days should be ample for the preliminary injunction hearing.

Service of this order is being made in court, so personal service is not necessary.

With respect to the temporary restraining order, the defendant represents that they have no intent to register the mark or domain www.Vidivixi.com.

With respect to the other requests for a temporary restraining order, those requests are denied.

Given the dispute among the parties as to the right to use Vidivixi, I could not make a determination of likelihood of success based upon the papers and arguments at this time.

Moreover, there is no showing of irreparable injury between now and the time when the preliminary injunction would be decided. It is unlikely that there are going to be sales, and even if there are sales, that the amount of those sales would be very substantial. In any event, the amount of those sales can be readily determined.

So I will leave in paragraph (g) on the request for a temporary restraining order and I will strike the other paragraphs of the temporary restraining order. There is no

necessity for a bond, in view of the fact that the defendants have no desire, no intent, to register the domain name in any event, and therefore there are no possible damages that result for which a bond would be necessary.

Has the plaintiff served the other copy on Ms. Lin and her lawyer? I want to make sure that she gets copies of this, in view of the fact that I am not requiring personal service; I just want to make sure that they are served. And I will make a copy of this order and give it to all of the parties here now.

MR. PEK: Ms. Lin has not been served other than by through email. I have a full courtesy copy, with a blank order to show cause, to accompany your Honor's conformed order to show cause that I can provide Ms. Lin today.

THE COURT: Okay, great. I'm going to give you the copy of the signed order to show cause now.

Anything else?

MR. PEK: One final question: With respect to the depositions that, given the short time span, I suspect, so long as notice is provided to all parties of any depositions --

THE COURT: You can get expedited depositions. Plainly, you don't need to give ten days' notice.

MR. PEK: Okay.

And for purposes of witness testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing itself, need we provide a witness list? Or is that in your Honor's local rules?

F9LKVIDM THE COURT: You should provide a witness list. The witness list should be provided prior to the final conference on October the 2nd. MR. PEK: Thank you, your Honor. MR. RAO: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. (Adjourned)